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Ethereum Trust Alliance
@ethtrustorg
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20 h |
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Today we are very proud to announce the formation of the Ethereum Trust Alliance (ETA)! Learn more about what we are building at ethtrust.org pic.twitter.com/fCvnHFvXNI
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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2 h |
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reddit.com/r/SubSimulator… is a great source for those.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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11 h |
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But zooming out, I prefer coming up with better low-level norms to empowering centralized actors to interfere with and compensate ad-hoc for any perceived problems. To me statism is the latter.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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11 h |
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What about a compromise between "who created it or found it or last received it in a transaction" and "who makes best use of it"? eg. Harberger taxes are one way to implement such a compromise.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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11 h |
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Credible neutrality nakamoto.com/credible-neutr… is one major metric by which some theories are better than others (eg. "if you make it you own it" is more neutral than "if you make it King George owns it"), but even among credibly neutral theories many choices exist...
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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11 h |
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Fast forwarding a bit, much of the distinction between "voluntary" and "coercive" depends on a theory of property rights. There are many possible such theories, and one can come up with theories that automatically assign more property to people who contribute to public goods.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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11 h |
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So if I walk onto a piece of grass that by convention is called "your backyard" and decide to sleep there, but you wake me up and force me to get out, my voluntary action is okay and your act of expulsion is coercive, agreed?
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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12 h |
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Are "free markets" (ie. local coordination + private property norms enforced by.... something) and states the only two alternatives?
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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13 h |
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It was not.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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13 h |
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One of my favorite families of algos.
vitalik.ca/general/2019/0…
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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18 h |
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I guess my mental machine of "if you see someone making an unconscionable argument try to turn it into a better argument and pretend they said that to be charitable" may have been overshooting then...
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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18 h |
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Here's my mental model of the steelman of Thielianism: you are more useful to making the world a better place if you bring industry A from 0 companies to 1 than if you bring industry B from 10 companies to 11. Society in general vilifies people who do the former too much.
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| vitalik.eth proslijedio/la je tweet | ||
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David Wong
@cryptodavidw
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2. sij |
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Matrix' answer to Moxie: On privacy versus freedom matrix.org/blog/2020/01/0…
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Nethermind
@nethermindeth
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3. velj |
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Nethermind is ready to be stateless.
The full beam sync (with full state being downloaded in the background) should be added soon and below is a stateless client (just headers and bodies downloaded) that serves the past account values. pic.twitter.com/VozGn3XQ8w
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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3. velj |
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Why go all the way and take out your wallet and check if you have a coin when you can just open up etherscan? 😊
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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3. velj |
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Obviously you should choose who pays based on whether the most recent block hash is odd or even.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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2. velj |
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Isn't the usual Chinese for bitcoin maximalist just 比特神教者?
Great work 🙏🙏
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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2. velj |
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I used to think this way 10 years ago. Less so now.
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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2. velj |
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How am I a statist?
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vitalik.eth
@VitalikButerin
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2. velj |
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On balance I don't support the document; the part I object the most to is the valorization of miner-driven governance.
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