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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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1. velj |
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How do people think that it is not a moral failing to believe that it is not wrong to torture babies?
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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11. sij |
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Checked SEP - apparently Philip Goff develops the argument you're suggesting.
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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11. sij |
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Hmm, at a first pass, the objection from zombies to physicalism is that, possibly, everything is physically like so but not mentally like so, thus physicalist supervenience fails. Panpsychism seems to trivially avoid that version of the objection?
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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10. sij |
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(also I’d say it was obviously devastating, if panpsychism weren’t just a walking objection to panpsychism)
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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10. sij |
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I agree with Thomas that this just seems like the combination problem; the difficulty in both cases is in seeing a priori how, given that a bunch of particles are conscious, the object that they compose is conscious.
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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10. sij |
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It seems to me the simplest analysis is that one breaks one's promise that p when it becomes the case that ~p. It becomes the case that G doesn't meet Z at 3.30 at 3.30; so G breaks his promise at 3.30. But G takes an action that ensures that G breaks his promise at 3.15.
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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5. sij |
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What are you talking about ??
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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8. pro |
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All my evidence indicates that p. However, I also know that, if I come to believe that p, millions will die a painful death. So, morally, I ought not to believe that p.
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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18. lis |
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Vincent Blair
@vblair15
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12. tra |
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‘Terms have been used in different ways at different times, therefore this term is not used this way now.’
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