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Mathy Vanhoef
PhD | Postdoc @ NYU Abu Dhabi / KU Leuven | Network Security & Applied Crypto | Dragonblood & & | PGP 95A987F5
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Mathy Vanhoef proslijedio/la je tweet
ACM WiSec 2020 16 h
WiSec'20 is now accepting submission of research papers on Wireless Security and Privacy! Paper submission deadline: February 28, 2020 CfP:
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Mathy Vanhoef 31. sij
Congratulations!!
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Mathy Vanhoef proslijedio/la je tweet
Lionel Page 27. sij
Amazing: a trail of termites (up) and a trail of ants (down), both protected by a row of their soldiers in a stand-off, without fighting. from
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Mathy Vanhoef 26. sij
Scripts to detect whether WPA2 clients are vulnerable to KRACK have been updated to work properly on the latest Kali release (which uses a new scapy version).
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Chris Evans 26. sij
Actually it's a cunning buffer overflow attack on the sequencer. Airgap, what airgap?:
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Davide Balzarotti 23. sij
The Security Circus 2019 update is now online:
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Mathy Vanhoef proslijedio/la je tweet
Travis Downs 22. sij
Yesterday I learned (YIL?) that even if a type is standard layout, and trivially copyable, it is not always safe, even in practice, to use it a destination for std::memcpy or to zero it with std::memset. That is, the following is not safe:
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Mathy Vanhoef 22. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @steven_odb
It is, but the MAC address often doesn't reveal the purpose of the device (e.g. you only learn that it's a Cisco AP).
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Mathy Vanhoef proslijedio/la je tweet
Katia Segers 21. sij
Alweer een mooi staaltje van grondige en een les van in mediawijsheid. Zeer de moeite om tot het einde door te lezen.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @DO9XE @yangrunenberger @Cunchem
Would this mainly be for home or professional networks?
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Spiff @KismetWireless
Most of it is Cisco. Smaller part is Abb/Trop and they do mesh networks and smart city stuff.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Cunchem
Not yet, so far we've only done a passive Wi-Fi wardrive. But actively trying to get the SSID might be a good idea.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @vanhoefm
It would be interesting to know about products that internally use hidden Wi-Fi networks. That can point us in the right direction.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Easi123
It might be something like that. Would be interesting to know which products indeed use Wi-Fi in this manner. Then we could try to check if these or similar products are used in certain areas.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Cunchem
Interesting. That would indeed point in the direction of smart city technology.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @ReneFReneF
Unlikely to be just home networks. But yes, lot's of Wi-Fi networks that don't broadcast their SSID.
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Mathy Vanhoef 21. sij
In a recent Wi-Fi wardrive we're seeing tons of hidden Wi-Fi networks in cities. In some cities almost 40% of networks are hidden ones! Who knows what is causing this? Maybe it's some Smart City technology?
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Mathy Vanhoef 15. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @fs111
Thanks, tweet removed. I clearly shouldn't be tweeting while having a headache.. :/
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Mathy Vanhoef 13. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @ryancdotorg @cybergibbons
Note that the above USENIX Security paper analyzes the security of the group key used to protect broadcast/multicast traffic. It's randomly generated by the AP. Both in WPA2/3 having a predictable group key is *bad*.
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Mathy Vanhoef 13. sij
Odgovor korisniku/ci @ryancdotorg @cybergibbons
In the WPA2 handshake, bad randomness has no real practical impact. Simplified, bad randomness in WPA3 effectively leaks the password (technically it leaks the password element P for a given client/AP pair).
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