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This is the hardest project I ever did, and the one I'm most proud of. Now that it's out, have been meaning to write a post about the content. It looks at the emergence of unfair conventions and norms across social groups (especially gender). Chapters described below: pic.twitter.com/20M3urJOlX
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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Chapter 1 introduces gendered division of labor as a target phenom. I discuss what conventions are, how they relate to coordination games, and argue that coordinating on complementary roles (i.e. different ones) poses a special problem for large groups.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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In ch 2 I introduce social categories (gender esp.), and show how they can act as symmetry breakers in coordination scenarios. I.e., if I know you are a man and I am a woman, I have extra information about who can play what role in coordinating household labor.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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Chapter 3 turns to cultural evolutionary models. This extra information means that once you have social categories, cultural evolution is completely altered. You robustly see the emergence of unfair equilibria that weren't possible in a uniform group.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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Chapter 4 connects this to gendered division of labor. Gender roles are conventional - they solve coordination problems, and could have been otherwise. Uses models to show that this can help explain why we have genders in the first place - to help with division of labor
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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The second half of the book turns to bargaining games, rather than coordination games. It focuses on how unfairness that doesn't help with coordination can easily/robustly emerge between a wider range of social categories.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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Chapter 5 looks at models exploring the role of power in the emergence of discrimination between groups. Shows how power can compound since it leads to bargaining advantage.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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Chapter 6 looks at the role of minority status in the emergence of bargaining norms. Shows how minority groups can be disadvantaged by dint of size. (See also: link.springer.com/article/10.100…)
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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Chapter 7 considers the causal link between discrimination and interaction structure. I.e., do those who are discriminated against avoid those who discriminate against them? Considers gender and co-authorship in academia as a case study.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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In chapter 8, I turn to household bargaining - why do women typically continue to do more household labor even in the face of increasing economic/social empowerment? I argue this is better explained by cultural evolutionary models, than more classic game theoretic ones.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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And the last chapter concludes by thinking about norm/convention change. A main idea: it is easy for inequity to emerge given how humans learn and interact. This is not a problem to solve, but a problem to keep dealing with.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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I owe thanks to *so many* fantastic co-authors and readers, including @lastpositivist, @__mnml, Justin Bruner, Hannah Rubin, Travis LaCroix, Calvin Cochran, @KevinZollman, @elkobadelko, so many others.
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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And to so many intellectual giants from sociology, philosophy, economics, political science, feminist thought - Cecilia Ridgeway, Brian Skyrms, Charles Tilly, Peyton Young, David Lewis, Margaret Gilbert, Helen Longino
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Cailin O'Connor
@cailinmeister
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26. lis |
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And Christina Bicchieri! And Ken Binmore!
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