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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @drossbucket @cdutilhnovaes
In the Cognitive Reflection Test, you have to forcefully inhibit your informal reasoning, which gets wrong answers. Nice analysis from ! gives similar examples from the Wason selection task: real-world relevance interferes.
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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @cdutilhnovaes
Reasoning with external material formal notation (squiggles on paper) accomplishes abstraction in two ways discussed by : de-semantification and ease of calculation.
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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness
De-semantification: If you read the word “raven” you usually get a visual image and are primed with all your background knowledge of ravens. Writing ɸ(x) instead of “is a raven” strips that off, and thereby inhibits the “merely reasonable” ways of thinking.
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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness
Humans evolved for concrete sensorimotor activity (e.g. foraging) and for social relationship maintenance. We didn’t evolve for formal rationality; unfortunately there is no “System 2” logic box in the brain, and we are terrible at it. We can manage only with external aids…
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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @cdutilhnovaes
Calculation: external formal notation repurposes our sensorimotor skills to perform operations our brains unaided mostly can’t. Logical giant A.N. Whitehead: “By the aid of symbolism, we can make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically by the eye” & below:
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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness
A well-designed formalism, skillfully deployed, makes each next calculation step *visually obvious* and therefore difficult to screw up. Mathematicians speak of calculative rationality as “symbol pushing” because at a felt level that’s exactly what we’re doing.
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Adam Strandberg 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness
how do we explain ramanujan in this framework
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David Chapman 12. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @The_Lagrangian
Which part of “goddess” do you not understand?
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David Chapman 13. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @The_Lagrangian
(more seriously: how do we explain Ramanujan in *any* framework??)
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Jennifer RM 13. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness @The_Lagrangian
Goddesses are spooks, right? ;-) Above you pointed to "propositions" or "beliefs" as spooks, but they reminded me of what many called a "sense" in late 1900s philosophy of language. Also, "senses" wreak havoc with most straightforward "NL-to-logic" translation attempts...
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Jennifer RM
2/ Basically, a person sortof(MUST) sortof(understand) THAT words after "that" sortof(refer) to nebulous mental objects... The (mostly failed) attempts to translate "NL-to-logic" very systematically often mention "intensional contexts" as jargon:
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Jennifer RM 13. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness @The_Lagrangian
3/ First language acquisition involves NOT explicitly knowing "all that has been learned"... But part of what people USUALLY pick up by age 8, which is helped by observing SOPHISTICATED (non-pidgin) NL, is how to systematically impute mental states:
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Jennifer RM 13. srp
Odgovor korisniku/ci @Meaningness @The_Lagrangian
4/ It makes sense to me that actual functional brain states might vary (some have aphantasia, some don't) and also be only partially captured in any external form (translation to paintings, or diagrams on a chalkboard, etc). I would expect confusion here as the default.
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