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@__agwa | |||||
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Hopefully the SHA-1 OCSP responses are all signed from a sub-CA technically constrained to OCSP (as required by Mozilla policy) so it can't be used to forge an actual certificate.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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You calculate a SHA-1 chosen prefix and you choose to attack the PGP Web-of-Trust!? Come on, forge an OCSP response from a publicly-trusted CA instead! mail-archive.com/dev-security-p…
sha-mbles.github.io
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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I haven't scanned OCSP responders in a while, but I'm sure there are still CAs signing OCSP responses with SHA-1, because it was never forbidden, and CAs will keep doing something dangerous as long as it's not forbidden.
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Tomas Hidalgo
@tommy_hs
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7. sij |
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Hi Andrew, I understood that the Ocsp answer must be issued from the same sub-ca that issues the final certificate... Is your sentence 100% correct? Thanks!
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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Yes, I'm correct. See Section 2.6 of RFC6960.
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