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Andrew Ayer
@
__agwa
Cambridge, MA + SF Bay Area
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Bootstrapped founder of @SSLMate, where I make SSL certificates easier and do #webpki and #CertificateTransparency stuff.
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924
Tweetovi
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174
Pratim
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1.490
Osobe koje vas prate
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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3. velj |
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They were doing that long before DarkMatter.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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3. velj |
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New blog post: When Will Your DNS Record Be Published? agwa.name/blog/post/when…
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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29. sij |
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That was issued by Digicert, from a white label intermediate CA.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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26. sij |
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Chrome announced their 2020 plans for Certificate Transparency: groups.google.com/a/chromium.org…
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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11. sij |
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I do not use AV.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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11. sij |
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Same. And I'm glad we got to meet in person, even if it was nigh impossible to have a conversation in that bar!
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Real World Crypto
@RealWorldCrypto
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7. sij |
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We are pleased to announce that #realworldcrypto 2020 will be live-streamed. Link: totalwebcasting.com/view/?func=VOF…
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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Yes, I'm correct. See Section 2.6 of RFC6960.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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Hopefully the SHA-1 OCSP responses are all signed from a sub-CA technically constrained to OCSP (as required by Mozilla policy) so it can't be used to forge an actual certificate.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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I haven't scanned OCSP responders in a while, but I'm sure there are still CAs signing OCSP responses with SHA-1, because it was never forbidden, and CAs will keep doing something dangerous as long as it's not forbidden.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. sij |
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You calculate a SHA-1 chosen prefix and you choose to attack the PGP Web-of-Trust!? Come on, forge an OCSP response from a publicly-trusted CA instead! mail-archive.com/dev-security-p…
sha-mbles.github.io
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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5. sij |
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Thanks!
The FSF considers any kind of linking to a (A)GPL-licensed software component to be a modification, requiring the entire combined work to be (A)GPL-licensed also. This blog post goes into greater detail: fsf.org/licensing/zfs-…
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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5. sij |
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New blog post: This Is Why You Always Review Your Dependencies, AGPL Edition agwa.name/blog/post/alwa…
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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27. pro |
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The other success story of CT is integrating it with certificate linters to make CAs issue certificates that are actually standards-compliant. Previously, certificate parsers had to be lax to parse all certificates. Now they can be strict, which is a huge win for security.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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27. pro |
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Certinomis is another example of a CA that was removed from Mozilla in large part due to misissuances found in CT
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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20. pro |
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Gah, Twitter ate the URL: git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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20. pro |
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Pretty sure the article is wrong. Although Linus was talking about making getrandom nonblocking, he ultimately went with this commit instead:
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Frank Denis
@jedisct1
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11. pro |
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miekg/dns before version 1.1.25 released today uses predictable DNS transaction IDs, can lead to response forgeries github.com/miekg/dns/issu… #golang
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. pro |
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It will be sort of like that, except the importing will be continuous (since CAA records can change over time) and the user will be informed over email when there's a change.
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Andrew Ayer
@__agwa
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7. pro |
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There's no CT-like system for DNS. Since Cert Spotter is a CT monitor, it shouldn't rely on a system that has weaker security guarantees than CT.
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